

DSACT – JAPCC CONFERENCE – 14 OCTOBER

It is a great pleasure for me to be here at this Conference.

I believe it is a great opportunity to improve the networking of NATO Commands and Centres of Excellence with Nations and Partners. Let me say that I appreciate very much the work done by the Centers of Excellence.

The JAPCC, in particular, is doing a very important job for NATO and the Nations. You are contributing to current operations working on fratricide prevention, the assessment of the UAV Conops for ISAF, assistance on JTAC matters, and providing assistance on Afghan Air Force C2. You also contribute shaping the future working for example on the UAV Roadmaps. Your unique expertise and high representation from Nations exemplify how valuable and important the role of COEs is for NATO.

The COEs are precious assets that sponsoring nations offer to NATO in order to provide expertise and competencies on topics of interest to nations and the Alliance. By working in specific areas such as training, lessons learned, concept development and experimentation, and doctrine/policy development, you provide great value to NATO. All these topics are fundamental to support transformation especially in times of economic crisis like the ones we are living and that require the best use of the finite resources we have.

NATO TODAY

The Alliance is at a crossroads. The Washington Treaty of 1949 remains the foundation of the Alliance to defend our security and common values. Also the set of core tasks and functions described in the 1999 Strategic Concept can still be considered valid. The Alliance has experienced so far 60 successful years. It has increased the number of signatory countries maintaining the vital solidarity needed and on decisions taken on the basis of consensus.

Threats, however, changed from a cold war scenario with a well defined enemy to a wide spectrum of risks, threats and potential strategic surprises.

During the past decades NATO has extended incrementally its interests outside the traditional area of responsibility. This process has seen the further involvement of NATO in the security environment.

In this regard, national perceptions across the various members are quite different. They reflect the different focus and interests they have in the Alliance: from USA and Canada to the European “old” members and the “new” Eastern Europe countries.

The economic crisis, the challenges that NATO is facing in Afghanistan, the transatlantic capability gap between Allies, and most importantly in my view, the role that NATO wants to play as an actor in a security environment where global challenges require global responses. This highlights a problem, which in its nature is political, but that has profound military implications. I refer here to the issue of matching level of ambition with appropriate resources and capabilities. I think that this point is one of the main challenges that the new Strategic Concept will have to sort out. However, Alliance members need to have a common understanding of the nature of the future principal risks, threats and challenges they face and its military consequences.

MULTIPLE FUTURES

In order to contribute to the ongoing debate in NATO on these themes, SACT initiated in March 2008 the Multiple Futures Project with a multi-national, cross-functional team comprising military and civilian staff in order to explore the question of future threats and challenges that could pose risks to the interests, values and populations of the Alliance. The MFP was an open, transparent and inclusive study with 21 workshops and strategic engagements and the involvement of representatives from 45 nations and more than 60 institutions.

The nature of evolving risks and threats will pose new demands for tools of prevention and response, making military strength only one component of a much larger capability set. It is this combination of purpose and capability that protects our solidarity, unity and equal sharing of burdens and risks.

I would like to focus on specific elements, which in my opinion merit special attention:

- The global security environment is changing rapidly, becoming increasingly blurred and hybrid in nature. Unpredictability and complexity of the future security environment will strain the Alliance's most powerful strengths: strategic unity of values and goals, solidarity among Allies, burden-sharing, and commitment to its decisions. It is essential that the Alliance continue to demonstrate its strength and resolve.
- The Alliance will be challenged in new ways and in new domains. Risks and threats emanating from state or non-state actors will challenge our traditional notion of what constitutes an Article 5 attack. The Alliance must maintain a common understanding of what constitutes an attack and how the Alliance would respond, thus sending a clear signal of deterrence. This includes the potential denial of access to resources, maritime commons and space, cyber attacks on economic or social infrastructure, or spill-over from regional conflicts.
- The Alliance needs to maintain superiority in conducting conventional war and improve its ability to conduct irregular warfare. To be effective in this environment, we must develop better partnerships, leverage relationships and work with other international organisations to improve the transparency of information and decision-making. A comprehensive, interagency approach, developed in concert with other international organisations like the EU and UN, is fundamental to the security of a diverse Alliance.

- Confronting hybrid threats requires a new mindset, new approaches, doctrines, strategies, concepts, tactics and capabilities. Future adversaries will extend their capabilities to non-traditional areas such as cyber space and outer space, but also in the maritime and information domains. In order to prevail, the Alliance must develop comprehensive maritime, space and cyber space strategies, policies and capabilities to defend and respond to emerging threats in these areas. That is why the Alliance will need to develop the ability to rapidly assess emerging technologies and strengthen its partnership with the industry.
- The human element, however, is fundamental when facing hybrid threats. Forces must be deployable, sustainable, flexible and adaptable: they will need robust command and control structures as well as logistic capabilities able to work effectively with an array of diverse partners and civilian authorities.
- At the same time the speed of change in the cyber space requires agile and configurable C2 systems, pushing decision-making to the lowest appropriate level. Equally, the development of capabilities to detect, identify, locate, engage and counter cyber-attacks is necessary to assure access to the flow of critical information.

In summary, the Alliance will have to maintain existing, and in some cases develop new capabilities and adapt its structures to address the emerging security challenges. We will be looking to COEs, in general, and JAPCC in particular, to assist in these areas. We will follow up on the MFP providing support to the drafting process of the new Strategic Concept. We will also develop the conceptual work on the various dimensions contributing with a Think-Tank role to the transformation of the Alliance.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

In this regard, the Strategic Concept has the objective to provide a clear forward-looking vision for the Alliance of the 21st Century. At stake is the ambition to

match ambition with capabilities in a strategic environment where the distinction between defense and security is not clear cut.

SECGEN has been tasked at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009 to develop a new Strategic Concept to be presented at the Summit in Autumn 2010. He has announced a group of experts, led by The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, and a roadmap that sets out the overall approach. The Strategic Commands are invited to participate fully in the process. The balance between operations and readiness of our troops, defense and security, conventional warfare and law enforcement, requires a match between ambitions and means. NATO must, at the end of the process, be able to deliver a military credible and achievable Strategic Concept where the military implications are fully understood. This has to occur in an economic environment where resources are scarce and probably will decrease further.

I would like to summarize some areas of concern seen from an ACT perspective:

- Conceptually, the traditional understanding of an Article 5 attack is being challenged (cyber, space, WMD, terrorism, attack on vulnerabilities to undermine NATO cohesiveness). However, the ideas of collective defense and deterrence must remain the cornerstone of the Alliance. In this context, NATO has a political and military role that goes beyond the geographical limits defined in the North Atlantic Treaty and could be more involved in preventive actions wherever its interests are at stake to avoid an open conflict.
- NATO needs to increase the collaboration with international organizations, such as the European Union and the United Nations developing a comprehensive approach and supporting capacity building. Being able to establish and work in partnerships will be key for NATO to be relevant also into the next decades.

TRANSFORMATION

SECGEN has, at different occasions, stated his intention to develop new ideas related to how NATO handles transformation and is convinced of the importance of transformation while Nations are challenged by the difficult economic situation. In this regard, let me say that since my arrival at ACT two years ago the main message I have tried to deliver to the NATO community and the Nations is: ACT is your Strategic Command for transformation and, in turn, COEs are an important element of the transformation effort for NATO and Nations.

It is true that the identity of ACT as agent for transformation is still not well defined and accepted. At the same time, the process and concept of transformation do not yet have solid foundations. However, the main point I want to highlight is that ACT and COEs are a tool that NATO and Nations can use to their benefit with great potential to improve their capability development and interoperability.

Transformation is important in spearheading new concepts, ideas, and ways of thinking in the context of an ever-changing security environment. We can help understand the security environment in order to make our forces more deployable and interoperable.

Vehicles for transformation are - amongst others - the introduction of, and agreement upon policies, concepts and doctrine, adaptation to the operational environment through the lessons learned process, the development of new capabilities, more flexible planning mechanisms and education and training. However, the point is that ACT cannot be responsible for transformation of NATO as a whole. Real change can only be ignited by consent of 28 nations. So whether we lead or not, we do support transformation in many areas, and we want to assist national efforts (where most transformation takes place).

In this regard, many think that we need to improve our ability to influence transformation within the Nations establishing closer and more formal links with

Nations providing support in defence planning, training, lessons learned and capability development. COEs are a critical link in this overall transformation effort, from National ideas into the NATO way of doing current and future business. And then taking the new way NATO approaches and facilitate their implementation back into Nations.

In summary, we are making progress in this area, but there is much more to do.

AIR AND SPACE

The conceptual work we have undertaken has to be related also to one of the most important dimensions: the one related to Air and Space.

The use of space assets is not any more the privilege of a few nations. As space technology evolves and becomes available more and more nations will use and rely on space assets for important civilian and military capabilities. Space based capabilities are already essential to the interest of the Alliance Nations and therefore access and freedom of action in the the extra atmospheric environment is crucial for our security. In strictly military terms, conducting today's or future operations will be extremely difficult without the support of space assets.

We are working with NATO HQ to start describing the NATO Space dimension. Building on the excellent work you in JAPCC did on assessing NATO needs related to Space, the IMS has just issued a Food for Thought paper, which aims to stimulate the discussion and be able to evaluate the key issues related to NATO's use of services or information provided by space assets. It would provide also a foundation upon future actions can be decided. Recognizing the importance of the Space dimension in the context of growing expeditionary operations is a must both in terms of policy and capabilities. A detailed study of the Space Dimension of the Alliance could provide a clear assessment on what the opportunities and deficiencies are. It is a very politically sensitive area, but we cannot pretend not to know how critical it is for the Alliance. Your work in this

area is essential in stimulating this discussion and helping Nations to understand the challenge ahead.

We must tackle this problem and develop a set of options deriving from the assessment of the current situation and setting up hopefully the basis for future Space policy and strategy of the Alliance.

Space has also to be considered from the C2 point of view. Space assets, as air assets, are scarce and high value, requiring C2 at the appropriate level. Space assets are essential for intelligence activities, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), GPS guided weapon systems, GPS precision navigation, ballistic missile early warning, just to mention a few examples of functions.

This brings me to another area of strong interest where we are putting our efforts together with all the other stakeholders. We are pursuing the development of an Air and Space C2 Concept, another important area where JAPCC is making a precious contribution. Here we must define and understand the problem we want to solve. It is clear to me that Air and Space C2 is an extremely critical area, influenced by a number of sensitivities.

Doctrine is rapidly becoming obsolete and we lack an overarching high level concept to guide the development of future air and space C2 capability through the DOTMPLFI domain. Changes to the operational environment are not taken into account into the current practices, technological and conceptual advancements are not yet considered.

We want a conceptual foundation for how Air and Space C2 should be conducted efficiently to best contribute to the joint operations. We must strive to develop BI-SC approaches that take into account the interests of all the stakeholders involved. We must use the expertise available at NATO level, but also at national level through the Centres of Excellence and the Nations. We must conduct an inclusive and transparent approach developing an engagement plan aimed at making sure that what we do is understood, agreed and fully integrated into NATO HQ efforts and views.

This is key to success because we cannot afford to fail in delivering these important conceptual pieces not only to the Air community but to NATO as a whole.

CLOSING

With these considerations I have concluded my address. Starting from the issues of NATO today, I have described my views with regard to the future security environment and the drafting process of the Strategic Concept. I have highlighted the problems and the opportunities that we have in NATO to help influence national efforts and transform their forces. I have finally introduced the two main and challenging strands of work we are undertaking in the Air and Space dimension.

I want to thank the JAPCC for the great work you are doing. You set the benchmark for all COEs and we appreciate very much your contribution to NATO and national transformational efforts.

I am ready to answer any question you may have. I am sure that we can have an interesting debate in the next Q&A period.