

Joint Air and Space Power Conference 2006

General Smith, SACT

"The importance of Joint Air & Space Power in NATO – the growing relevance of Unmanned Air & Space Capabilities."

- Transforming of Joint A&S Power – exploiting UACs.
- JAPCC is doing exactly what we asked for.
- Our job is to put into practice the products of JAPCC.
- The total environment in which we operate has changed, threat, technology, capabilities.
- The threat – traditional, irregular, unique aspects (blends into population, no respect for law, individual goal is to kill & die).
- Strategic effects are achieved at the individual level.
- Difficult to fight a war where death is celebrated, the enemy wants to die.
- The fight we need to focus on is the irregular warrior.
- Insights into the irregular warrior – uses media, is patient, fights a war in decades, uses modern technology like Internet, cell phone, spans all level of society, uses religion to support cause, gets disproportionate attention from media.
- Exploit freedoms we live by.
- They try to get us make mistakes – this is where we need to exploit UAVs.
- More & more the battle is going into the city, not a familiar battlefield for our soldiers.
- Needs money – importance to track flow of money.
- Challenge is to get inside the enemy's OODA loop.
- Capabilities needed:
 - Observe through the roofs of buildings, under ground and stand-off – need radar that can look through the ground, silence is important on UAV.
 - Orient - Common operating picture to the lowest tactical levels. Information is so overwhelming, it becomes obvious you must be able to move information to lowest level in tactical. Orient at lowest tactical level, not highest strategic level – collaboration is key (lateral collaboration) not command and control. Making a decision at the Operational/Strategic level is challenging when looking at streaming video from a UAV (tactical level input) – much more intelligence is needed to validate the input tactical picture.
 - Decide – Authorities must be moved down the chain of command.
 - Act – with lethality must be done with precision and little or no collateral damage.
- Interoperability is key. Discussed story about introducing UAVs into theatre without coordination on frequencies.
- Access is challenging as is bandwidth. Must get information to decision makers faster.
- Fidelity – looking at UAV images it is difficult to make quality decisions due to lack of fidelity.
- Persistence – if it's not persistent it offers little utility.
- What must it look like? 21st century?

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- Must move global, adaptive, interdependent roles.
- Capabilities based agile, precision.
- Success focused stability & Reconstruction – measure of success must be institutions that govern basic civilization.
- Art of the possible, constellation of UAVs, persistent surveillance over the city. Being able to track backward to get at the environment to trace movement of the enemy.
- Challenges.
- System compatibility, we are purchasing systems that are not compatible so we need help to develop standards so industry can build to our requirements.
- Philosophy of control – who is going to fly the UAV, controls the sensor, control the battlefield. Today we're building to operate at different levels so airspace control is critical.
- Authority to Release – who is the authority? Due to collateral damage concern we push the authority higher.
- Spectrum management – huge problem. Corps comd controlling 82,000 freqs.
- Unending appetite for full motion video – requirement at the tactical level is becoming a demand – if you cannot meet the demand, industry will and if not done correctly will introduce problems.
- Way ahead.
- Requires complete awareness.
- Compatible systems and integrated.
- Releasable data.

Q&A

Q - Soda straw view and the proliferation of UAVs – Airman focused little Joint – Inability to task properly the UAV resources. Give us a view from CENTCOM.

A - Not solved. Airmen have great appreciation for centralized control – land element doesn't appreciate this as much. Build constellations to provide picture to those who need it. UAVs are looking at UAVs but not linked. Need to be sharing the picture.

Q - How should we deal with asymmetric operations, the press – we should be allowed to make mistakes. We are involved with operations for very long operations – not a right approach. We are at risk of minimizing the military capacity during long operations.

A – The media is the media and we must learn to tell our story better. The enemy is very savvy on media. Damage is done initially with media reports and we must be able to manage in that environment. They have long view, and more patience than we do. We better make up our minds whether this war is worth winning. This is a religious war to them.

Joint Air and Space Power Conference 2006

Q – Combat ID is challenging.

A - Focus on where airpower can be more pre-eminent. If you don't remain relevant, you go out of business.

Q – Decision of what is and is not a target? Using UAVs for CAS?

A – Unblinking eye effect – each time there is a gap in the surveillance for analysis and hand-off, there is a gap to understand the full environment – to fully understand the limitations of Full motion video from the human perspective – capable to accept info from multiple sources at a lower and lower decision level.

Building a Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre based on culture of Special Forces by merging capabilities.

Q – EBO we talk kinetic and non-kinetic effects. To what extent can UAVs contribute to PsyOps?

A – Non-kinetic is more important than kinetic. “What scares the enemy most is what he or she doesn't know”. We are at the leading edge of how we use the UAVs.